The Strait of Hormuz disruption exposed how quickly a chokepoint can hit oil exports and government revenues. Producers are now weighing the cost of new pipelines against the losses a future interruption could bring. Iraq’s plans stand out: alongside a rapid expansion of its northern export route, Baghdad is considering longer routes to Mediterranean ports.
Existing pipelines gain new importance
Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline showed the value of having an alternative to Gulf shipping. During the disruption, the country redirected crude toward the Red Sea and raised pipeline flows to about 7 million barrels per day. Loading capacity at Yanbu Port limited how much could be exported through the route. Saudi Arabia built the pipeline in the 1980s with the risk of a Hormuz closure in mind, as Reuters energy columnist Ron Bousso has noted.
The UAE also has a route to the Gulf of Oman: a pipeline to Fujairah, outside the Strait of Hormuz. The country plans to double that pipeline’s capacity, from 1.8 million barrels per day to 3.6 million, with the new line scheduled for completion by the end of next year. Related: Equinor to Boost Troll Gas Output with $412 Million Subsea Development
For Iraq, the exposure is more acute. More than 90% of its oil exports traditionally travel through the Persian Gulf. Before the conflict, exports averaged more than 3.3 million barrels per day; they then fell to a fraction of that level. Production dropped from more than 4 million barrels per day to barely above 1 million, squeezing government revenues and making domestic energy needs a higher priority.
Baghdad is moving to raise capacity on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which carries oil from northern Iraq. The line now handles about 200,000 barrels per day, and Iraq wants to lift that figure to roughly 770,000 within months. That would offer a near-term outlet, while plans for routes through Syria and Jordan could provide more options over time.
Mediterranean routes bring bigger ambitions
A broader proposal, the Four Seas Initiative, would connect Middle Eastern oil fields to Mediterranean ports and position Turkey and Syria as export hubs. The New Lines Institute, which proposed the initiative, argues that Syria’s post-Assad transition could create an opening for a regional energy corridor. Its assessment depends on political conditions holding well enough to support the construction and operation of major infrastructure.
The institute says the plan could advance European energy independence from Russian and Iranian supplies, expand U.S. commercial influence, generate transit revenue for Syrian reconstruction and support a lasting political settlement. Those are the organization’s stated aims; delivering them would depend on cooperation among countries with different interests.
Turkey’s effort to become a regional energy hub, particularly for natural gas, aligns with parts of the proposal. Ankara’s strategy also includes transit of Russian gas, underscoring that the initiative would sit within a more complicated set of energy relationships. The proposed network is estimated to cost about $10 billion. Exporters may see that scale of spending as worthwhile if it reduces their exposure to disruptions and the resulting lost sales.
Not every exporter has an easy alternative
Kuwait and Qatar have fewer options for bypassing Hormuz because they lack comparable domestic export pipelines, Bousso wrote. They would need to rely on neighboring countries’ infrastructure. For Qatar, that could mean working through the UAE or Saudi Arabia, despite tensions with both.
Pipeline expansion can reduce reliance on a single shipping route, but it takes time, capital and cross-border coordination. The current risk of another Hormuz disruption appears limited unless hostilities resume. The recent shock has nevertheless changed the calculation: producers are treating alternate routes as part of export security, with Iraq’s rapid Kirkuk-Ceyhan expansion offering the clearest near-term test.