Hormuz traffic remains a fraction of its prewar pace, leaving energy markets exposed to continued disruption. Shipping data counted six commodity vessels crossing on Monday, while Bloomberg’s tally put commercial crossings at five. The categories and counting methods differ, so the figures aren’t directly interchangeable; their shared message is that activity remains thin. Either count is well below the roughly 80 to 100 daily transits Bank of America says would be needed to stabilize energy markets.
Monday’s crossings
Kpler data cited by Reuters showed four commodity vessels entering the Persian Gulf and two leaving, compared with an 11-vessel daily average over the latest 10-day period. Bloomberg recorded one outbound vessel, producing a total of five commercial crossings. A one-vessel difference can matter when daily volumes are this low, but it doesn’t change the broader comparison with the much higher traffic levels cited for a stable market.
Two empty product tankers entered the Gulf. Among the vessels heading out were a small LNG carrier and a tanker carrying residual fuel to buyers. The mix matters because vessel counts alone don’t show how much energy is moving: ships vary in size, cargo, and destination, and an empty tanker entering the Gulf doesn’t represent an immediate export. The difference between the two data providers is small, but both show traffic well below recent averages.
The slowdown follows renewed fading hopes for a U.S.-Iran deal. Traffic had briefly improved from mid-June to early July during a tentative reopening tied to a memorandum of understanding that has since collapsed. By late July, crossings had fallen to a more than two-month low. That sequence suggests how quickly expectations around access can shift; a temporary increase in sailings doesn’t establish that operators see the route as dependable again.
Security risk and energy flows
Recent attacks on ships and persistent threats have heightened security concerns around Hormuz. Iran is seeking to exert control over vessels using the strait, while Iran-aligned Houthis have threatened Saudi-linked shipments in the Red Sea and near Bab el-Mandeb. For shipping companies, risk can shape decisions before any physical blockage occurs: uncertainty about safe passage may affect whether and when vessels sail. The scale of that effect isn’t captured by a daily crossing count alone.
Bab el-Mandeb traffic was steadier on Monday, at roughly its 10-day average of 24 vessels. That contrast offers little relief to energy flows: Hormuz is the sharper constraint, with current traffic estimated at just five to 10 ships a day versus about 140 before the war. A second route operating near its recent average can’t compensate for a larger disruption at the main chokepoint. And the two routes face different security conditions, so a comparison in vessel totals has limits.
Francisco Blanch, Bank of America’s head of commodities and derivatives research, told CNBC on Monday that traffic would need to rise tenfold to normalize oil prices. His estimate points to the scale of the gap: even a return toward 80 to 100 daily crossings, short of the prewar level, would be a substantial recovery from current volumes. It’s a high bar, and it frames the issue as one of sustained capacity rather than a modest bounce in daily activity.
This is more significant than it looks. The difference between a handful of crossings and a normal flow isn’t just a shipping statistic; it bears on how much confidence markets can place in energy moving through the route. That said, the figures provided don’t establish how much supply is delayed or how prices will respond. Counts describe passage, while market effects also depend on cargo size, inventories, alternative routes, and expectations.
For now, the market signal is persistent weakness in a key energy transit route. A sustained pickup in crossings would matter more than a single day’s movement; until then, security conditions and vessel flows remain central indicators for energy supply risk. If you’re working in this space, watch the trend across several reporting periods and compare sources on their own terms. One day’s reading can be noisy. The pattern is the point.
What a recovery would need to show
A meaningful improvement would involve more than a brief rise in departures or arrivals. Similar chokepoint disruptions are assessed through repeated evidence that vessels are using the route in both directions and that activity holds above recent levels. Here’s the thing: a higher count would be evidence of improved traffic, but it wouldn’t by itself prove that security concerns had eased or that energy markets had returned to normal.
Nor does the gap between current estimates and the 80 to 100 crossings cited by Bank of America tell the whole story. Different providers may track different vessel categories, and daily totals can swing as ships arrive in clusters. The broad direction is clearer than the precision of any single count: current activity remains far below the level the bank associates with stabilization. (And this is the part most people overlook.) A gradual recovery could still leave the market exposed if traffic remains inconsistent.
That makes the next readings useful as evidence, not as a verdict. Higher and sustained crossings would indicate that more vessels are moving through Hormuz; renewed weakness would reinforce the picture of an unreliable route. The numbers are underwhelming. For energy markets, the practical question is whether traffic can keep rising while security concerns persist.